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Differentially Private Contextual Dynamic Pricing


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Differential Privacy (DP)

- **Neighboring Dataset:** $X', X \subset \mathbb{R}^d$ are neighbors if they differ in only one data of an individual.
- **Differential Privacy:** A randomized mechanism $\mathcal{M}: X \rightarrow O$ is ϵ -DP if for all neighboring inputs X', X , for all outputs $o \in O$ we have:

$$\mathbb{P}(\mathcal{M}(X) = o) \leq e^\epsilon \mathbb{P}(\mathcal{M}(X') = o)$$



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
$$\mathbb{P}(\mathcal{M}(X) = o) \leq e^\epsilon \mathbb{P}(\mathcal{M}(X') = o)$$

- ϵ smaller, strongly privacy guarantee
- For small ϵ : $e^\epsilon \approx 1 + \epsilon \approx 1$

Bound the “maximum amount” that one person’s data can change the output of a computation.


Some Key Properties of DP

- **Robustness to post-processing:** If $\mathcal{M}: \mathbb{R}^d \rightarrow \mathcal{O}$ is ϵ -DP, then for any arbitrary randomized mapping $F: \mathcal{O} \rightarrow \mathcal{O}'$, the mechanism $F \circ \mathcal{M}$ is also ϵ -DP



Some Key Properties of DP

- **Robustness to post-processing:** If $\mathcal{M}: \mathbb{R}^d \rightarrow \mathcal{O}$ is ε -DP, then for any arbitrary randomized mapping $F: \mathcal{O} \rightarrow \mathcal{O}'$, the mechanism $F \circ \mathcal{M}$ is also ε -DP
- **Composition:** For $j \in [k]$, if \mathcal{M}_j is ε_j - DP, then the mechanism $(\mathcal{M}_1, \dots, \mathcal{M}_k)$ is $\sum_j \varepsilon_j$ - DP



Contextual Dynamic Pricing

- In each timestep: *seller* has a *good* to sell to a *buyer* and needs to decide which price to put it in the market.
- At each time step t :
 - Seller receives a **good** $\mathbf{x}_t \in \mathbb{R}^d$
 - Buyer's **value** v_t : unknown to seller
 - Seller sets a price p_t and observes $y_t = \mathbb{1}_{\{p_t \leq v_t\}}$:
 - $p_t \leq v_t$, a sale is achieved and seller collects revenue $r_t = p_t$;
 - $p_t > v_t$, no sale is achieved and seller collects zero revenue: $r_t = 0$.
- Applications: online advertisements; real-estate,

Contextual Dynamic Pricing

- **Privacy Leakage**
 - Optimal Pricing policy is possible!
 - Buyers' past purchases are sensitive personal information.
- Goal: design a pricing policy which not only maximize her revenue but also protect the buyers' personal information

Private Pricing -- Objective

Privacy Guarantee

- Use **differential privacy** as privacy measure.
- A pricing policy \mathcal{A}
 - Feature vector sequence: $\mathbf{X} = \{\mathbf{x}_t\}_{t \geq 1}$;
 - Valuation sequence: $\mathbf{V} = \{v_t\}_{t \geq 1}$;
 - Response sequence: $\mathbf{Y} = \{y_t\}_{t \geq 1}$;
 - Price sequence: $\mathbf{P} = \{p_t\}_{t \geq 1}$

$$\Pr(\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y} | \mathbf{V}) = \mathbf{P}) \leq e^\epsilon \Pr(\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y}' | \mathbf{V}') = \mathbf{P}) + \delta, \quad \forall \mathbf{P}$$

Private Pricing -- Objective

Utility Guarantee – minimize seller's Regret

$$\underbrace{\sum_{t=1}^T p_t^* \mathbb{1}_{\{p_t^* \leq v_t\}}}_{\text{OPT}} - \underbrace{\sum_{t=1}^T p_t \mathbb{1}_{\{p_t \leq v_t\}}}_{\text{Performance}}$$

- p_t^* : optimal price for good x_t -- knows the hidden v_t

Private Pricing -- Objective

Utility Guarantee – minimize seller's Regret

$$\text{Regret}_{\mathcal{A}}(T) = \sup_{\mathbf{x}} \left(\underbrace{\sum_{t=1}^T p_t^* \mathbb{1}_{\{p_t^* \leq v_t\}}}_{\text{OPT}} - \underbrace{\sum_{t=1}^T p_t \mathbb{1}_{\{p_t \leq v_t\}}}_{\text{Performance}} \right)$$

For any adversarial arrival products

- p_t^* : optimal price for good x_t -- knows the hidden v_t

Sublinear regret: $\text{Regret}_{\mathcal{A}}(T) = o(T)$

Assumptions We Make

To solve the problem, we assume:

- Linear valuation : $v_t(\mathbf{x}_t) = \boldsymbol{\theta}^\top \mathbf{x}_t + z_t$
 - $\boldsymbol{\theta}$: unknown but fixed;
 - $z_t \sim F$: i.i.d drawn from F
 - By **Postprocessing property**, protecting $\{v_t\}$ reduce to protect $\{z_t\}$
- $F(v)$ and $1 - F(v)$ are log-concave in v .
 - A function f is log-concave $\rightarrow \log f$ is concave.
 - Including normal, uniform, and (truncated) Laplace, exponential, and logistic distributions.


Main Results

Main Result: reduction to **online convex optimization** with desired privacy

Guarantee.

- $\text{Regret}_{\mathcal{A}}(T) = \sup_X \left(\sum_{t=1}^T p_t^* \mathbb{1}_{\{p_t^* \leq v_t\}} - \sum_{t=1}^T p_t \mathbb{1}_{\{p_t \leq v_t\}} \right)$ **protect** $\{z_t\}$.

non-convex and no first order information



$$l_t(\theta) = -\mathbb{1}_{\{p_t \leq v_t\}} \log(1 - F(p_t - \langle x_t, \theta \rangle)) - \mathbb{1}_{\{p_t > v_t\}} \log(F(p_t - \langle x_t, \theta \rangle)): \text{Convex!}$$

- $\text{Regret}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\theta}(T) = \sup_X \sum_{t=1}^T (l_t(\hat{\theta}_t) - l_t(\theta))$ **protect** $\{\hat{\theta}_t\}$.

Main Results

Main Result: reduction to **online convex optimization with desired privacy**

Guarantee.

- $\text{Regret}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\theta}(T) = \sup_{\mathbf{X}} \sum_{t=1}^T (l_t(\hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t) - l_t(\boldsymbol{\theta}))$ protect $\{\hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t\}$.

Theorem: We can design an algorithm which achieves regret of $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{dT}/\varepsilon)$ with ensuring it is ε -differentially private.

d = feature dimensions, *T* = number of arrivals, \tilde{O} suppress the logarithmic factors

- Note: the best-known bound of non-private policy's is $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$
- Only worse to constant factor \sqrt{d}/ε

Technique

Main Result: reduction to **online convex optimization with desired privacy**


Guarantee.

- $\text{Regret}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\theta}(T) = \sup_{\mathbf{X}} \sum_{t=1}^T (l_t(\hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t) - l_t(\boldsymbol{\theta}))$ protect $\{\hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t\}$.
- Online gradient descent doesn't work: $\hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{t+1} = \hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t - \eta_t \nabla l_t(\hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t)$
 - **By post-processing property:** reduce to ensure \mathcal{A} is ϵ -DP w.r.t sequences of $(\nabla l_1(\hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_1), \nabla l_2(\hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_2), \dots, \nabla l_T(\hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_T))$

Technique

- Prototypical algorithms for online convex optimization


- Gradient Descent: $\hat{\theta}_{t+1} = \text{Project}_{\Theta} \left(\hat{\theta}_t - \eta \nabla l_t(\hat{\theta}_t) \right)$



One single change in F will influence all subsequent updates on $\hat{\theta}$, which
exaggerate the added noise to ensure privacy!


Technique

- Follow The Approximate Leader (FTAL)
 - Use all previous $\{\hat{\theta}_s\}_{s < t}$ to compute the $\hat{\theta}_t$
 - $\hat{\theta}_t = \operatorname{argmax}_{\hat{\theta} \in \Theta} \langle \sum_{s=1}^{t-1} \nabla l_s(\hat{\theta}_s), \hat{\theta} \rangle$



Technique

- Private FTAL: $\hat{\theta}_t = \operatorname{argmax}_{\theta \in \Theta} \langle \sum_{s=1}^{t-1} \nabla l_s(\hat{\theta}_s), \theta \rangle$
 - $\sum_{s=1}^{t-1} \nabla l(\hat{\theta}_s)$ is DP
 - Tree-based Aggregation Protocol on high-dimensional space



Data: $\nabla l_1(\hat{\theta}_1)$ $\nabla l_2(\hat{\theta}_2)$ $\nabla l_3(\hat{\theta}_3)$ $\nabla l(\hat{\theta}_4)$ $\nabla l_5(\hat{\theta}_5)$ $\nabla l_6(\hat{\theta}_6)$ $\nabla l_7(\hat{\theta}_7)$...

Thank you.